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a. Autonomous Car Sharing 
b. Sensitivity analysis (ETHZ cost calculator) 
c. Comparison of Autonomous Car and Ride Sharing 
 
4. Conclusion and outlook 
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• Introduction of autonomous vehicles within next years/decades 
• Privately owned vehicles 
• Autonomous Carsharing Systems (ACS) 
• Autonomous Ridesharing Systems (ARS) 
 
• Different interests of different stakeholders 
 
• Uncertainty in the acceptance by users 
 
• This study: sketch planning with a grid-search approach to get estimates of 
potential impacts on the mobility market 
• Operator profit 
• System costs 
• Modal split, total mileage 
 
Motivation 
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Methodology 
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• Based on German NHTS data (MiD 2008) 
• 60k persons 
• 190k reported trips 
• 35k vehicles 
 
• Trip generation: socio-demographic projection to 2035 
• # individuals per area type (urban, suburban, rural) 
• # individuals per age group and gender 
• # driver licenses (cohort effect) 
 
• Diffusion of AVs into the private fleet (rates depend on vehicle class) 
• Mobilisation of new user groups (impaired, no drivers license, teenagers) 
• Reduction of VTTS in AVs (–25%)  
• Reduction of access and egress times 
 
Travel demand generation for Germany in 2035 
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For details, see 
Trommer et al. (2016) 
• Generation of attributes for non-chosen modes 
 
• Gravity model for distance class choice 
 
• Multinomial logit model for mode choice 
 
• No network loading  distance based, mode-specific travel times 
 
• Result: reference scenario with private AVs 
• Up to 20% AVs in the fleet by 2035 
• Up to 10% increase in VKT 
• Modal shift mainly from PT 
 
Destination and mode choice 
> hEART 2017 > Autonomous car- and ride-sharing systems • Benjamin Kickhöfer • 13.09.2017 DLR.de  •  Slide 7 
For details, see 
Trommer et al. (2016) 
New modes: Autonomous Car- or Ridesharing 
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ACS ARS 
ACS ARS 
Shared Vehicles √ √ 
Shared Rides √ 
Detours  possible √ 
Empty rides possible √ √ 








𝐴𝑃𝑉   … Average serving area per vehicle [𝑘𝑚2] 
 





𝛼, 𝛽    … Scale factors 
New modes: calculation of waiting times 
(in absence of a network) 
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Urban 
𝑑𝑛𝑣 ≈  𝛼 ∗ 𝛽 ∗ 𝐴𝑃𝑉 ∗ 𝑉𝑈𝑅 







distance to the next 
empty vehicle 
𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑦 , 𝑇𝑤𝑎𝑖𝑡 
Demand 
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Results: 
Autonomous Car Sharing (ACS) 
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Grid search 
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ACS: operator profit landscape 
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• Zero Profit (ZP):     0.33 €/user-km ; 4.50 veh/1000 inh 
• Unregulated Monopoly (UM): 1.00 €/user-km ; 1.55 veh/1000 inh 
• System Optimum (SO):   0.23 €/user-km ; 6.50 veh/1000 inh 
ZP 
UM 
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ACS: system costs 
(sum of operator profit and generalized user costs) 
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• Zero Profit (ZP):     0.33 €/user-km ; 4.50 veh/1000 inh 
• Unregulated Monopoly (UM): 1.00 €/user-km ; 1.55 veh/1000 inh 
• System Optimum (SO):   0.23 €/user-km ; 6.50 veh/1000 inh 
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Results: 
Sensitivity analysis 
(ETHZ cost calculator) 
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Sensitivity analysis for ACS: cost structure 
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DLR 
(Trommer et al. 2016) 
ETHZ 
(based on Bösch et al. 2017)* 
Depreciation, Capital Cost [€/veh-km] 
 
0.12 0.092 









Profit Margin & VAT [€/veh-km] 
 
0.00 0.044 
Total Cost [€/veh-km] 0.28 0.48 
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* 1 EUR = 1.07 CHF 
Sensitivity analysis for ACS: cost structure (DLR) 
 















































User price [EUR/km] 
SO 
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• Zero Profit (ZP):     0.33 €/user-km ; 4.50 veh/1000 inh 
• Unregulated Monopoly (UM): 1.00 €/user-km ; 1.55 veh/1000 inh 
• System Optimum (SO):   0.23 €/user-km ; 6.50 veh/1000 inh 
• Rural areas break-even at ~0.40 €/km 
Sensitivity analysis for ACS: cost structure (ETHZ) 
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• Zero Profit (ZP):     0.64 €/user-km ; 2.25 veh/1000 inh 
• Unregulated Monopoly (UM): 2.00 €/user-km ; 1.00 veh/1000 inh 
• System Optimum (SO):   0.32 €/user-km ; 4.60 veh/1000 inh 
• Rural areas break-even at ~1.50 €/km 
Sensitivity analysis for ACS: cost structure 













Change of VKT  
(w.r.t. ref. case) 
System costs 
[Mio. € p.d.] 
ZP: DLR cost 0.33 4.50 ~0 10.6 % + 3.7 % -402.9 
ZP: ETHZ cost 0.64 2.25 ~0 7.3 % + 2.0 % -432.8 
UM: DLR cost 1.00 1.55 13.0 5.4 % + 1.5 % -434.3 
UM: ETHZ cost 2.00 1.00 6.8 3.4 % + 0.9 % -457.6 
SO: DLR cost 0.23 6.50 -14.1 12.7 % + 5.5 % -397.6 
SO: ETHZ cost 0.32 4.60 -22.3 10.8 % + 3.9 % -424.8 
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• Zero profit: most likely case in competitive situation 
• System optimum: subsidies needed > likely to change if external effects are 
considered (see change in VKT!) 
• Unregulated monopoly: regulation needed to avoid over-pricing  
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Results: 
Comparison of ACS and ARS 
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• ARS: 
• Simplistic pooling strategy based on demand (per 1x1km raster, 10 min time 
bins and rough direction). 
• Less attractive than ACS (vehicle waits for 10 min for other passengers). 
• However, splitting costs is possible and makes it cheaper than ACS. 
 
• So far: 
• User price and fleet density fixed for all area types (urban, suburban, rural). 
• That is, urban areas subsidize rural areas. 
 
• Now: 
• User price and fleet density varies for every area type. 





Comparison of ACS and ARS 
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Zero profit supply parameters for different area types 
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• ARS can reach price levels comparable to PT in urban areas 
• Spatial differences of prices are higher for ARS than for ACS 
• Reason: high potential of pooling in urban areas yielding very low user prices 
Zero Profit (ZP) vs Unregulated Monopoly (UM) 
> hEART 2017 > Autonomous car- and ride-sharing systems • Benjamin Kickhöfer • 13.09.2017 DLR.de  •  Slide 22 
• UM: High prices lower pooling probabilities > higher VKT 
• ZP: Lower prices increase pooling probabilities in urban areas > lower VKT 







[Mio. € p.d.] 
Mode share 
Change of VKT  
(w.r.t. ref. case) 
ZP: ACS 0.30 – 0.35 3.0 – 5.0 ~0 8.2 – 12.5 % +3.0 to +5.7 %  
ZP: ARS 0.12 – 0.38 2.5 – 3.5 ~0 4.4 – 11.1 % –1.5 to +2.7 % 
UM: ACS 0.95 – 1.05 1.4 - 1.6 13.2 4.2 – 6.2 % +1.2 to +1.6 %  
UM: ARS 0.45 – 0.80 1.3 – 1.5 6.2 2.5 – 6.0 % +1.1 to +1.8  %  
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Conclusion and outlook 
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Conclusion and outlook 
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• Sketch planning tool allows to get first estimates  of country-wide/area type 
impacts on the mobility market through ACS/ARS  
 
• Results are highly dependent on utility functions, vehicle operations, and operator 
cost structure > good test: under which circumstances exists a business case? 
 
• Results hint towards regulatory measures (for the monopoly case) or even 
subsidies of ACS, ARS (for the system optimal case); however, externalities need 
to be considered/modeled 
 
• Only ARS is able to reduce VKT in urban areas; 
all other schemes increase VKT 
 
• Future research: 
• Use behavioral parameters by Steck et al. (2017 forthcoming) 
• Differentiation by time 
• Consideration of externalities 
• Implications on car ownership? 
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Thank you. 
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Backup methodology 
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Aspatial travel demand model 
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Distance based, mode-specific travel speed 





Utility functions for ACS, ARS 
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𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐶𝑆 = min 𝑇𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠, 𝑊𝑇𝐴𝐶𝑆 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑡 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑦 𝑣𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑙𝑒
+ 𝐷𝑇𝐴𝐶𝑆(𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒) + 𝑇𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 
𝑇𝑇𝐴𝑅𝑆 = min 𝑇𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠, 𝑊𝑇𝐴𝑅𝑆
𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑡 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑦 𝑣𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑙𝑒,
𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒,𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚 ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑤𝑎𝑦
+ 𝐷𝑇𝐴𝐶𝑆(𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒, 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑜𝑢𝑟 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟) + 𝑇𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 
𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑜𝑢𝑟 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝐴𝑅𝑆 = 𝑓(𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒,𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡𝐴𝑅𝑆) 
 p𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑟 = 
𝑝𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑟.𝑘𝑚.𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎
∗ 𝑘𝑚𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑟  
𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑡 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑦 𝑣𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑙𝑒𝐴𝐶𝑆/𝐴𝑅𝑆 =
𝑓(𝑣𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑠/𝑖𝑛ℎ𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠, 𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒, 𝑣𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑙𝑒 𝑢𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒) 
S𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑡𝑜 
𝑐𝑎𝑟 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑃𝑇 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒 
Constant Price Travel time 
ARS 
Pooling strategy ARS 












Input:vehicles/inhabitants , 𝑝𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑟.𝑘𝑚.𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎,  
Operator cost structure 
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𝐶𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 = 𝐶𝑓𝑖𝑥,𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑓𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑡 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝐶𝑣𝑎𝑟,𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟(𝐾𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑦 , 𝐾𝑀𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑑) 

























Curve with economies of scale
Curve without economies of scale (25
Veh./empl.)









































• Operator revenue as product of user price per km and sum of vehicle-km in use 
𝑅𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 = 𝑝𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑟.𝑘𝑚 ∗ 𝑘𝑚𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑟 
With: 𝑝𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑟.𝑘𝑚  … price per user km [€/km] 
 𝑘𝑚𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑟  … vehicle-km (loaded) [km] 
 
• Operator costs as sum of fixed operator costs per vehicle and product of 
variable operator costs per km and sum of vehicle-km (empty and loaded) 
𝐶𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 = 𝑝𝑓𝑖𝑥.𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟.𝑣𝑒ℎ ∗ 𝑣𝑒ℎ + 𝑝𝑣𝑎𝑟.𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟.𝑘𝑚 ∗ (𝑘𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑦 + 𝑘𝑚𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑟) 
With: 𝑝𝑓𝑖𝑥.𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟.𝑣𝑒ℎ … fix operator costs per vehicle [€/vehicle per year] 
 𝑝𝑣𝑎𝑟.𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟.𝑘𝑚 … variable operator costs per vehicle-km [€/km] 
 𝑣𝑒ℎ  … number of vehicles 
 𝑘𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑦  … vehicle-km (empty) [km] 
 
 
Operator revenue and costs 
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• Operator profit as difference between operator revenues and operator costs 
Π𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 = 𝑅𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 − 𝐶𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 
With: 𝜋𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 … Operator profit [€] 
 𝑅𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 … Operator revenue [€] 
 𝐶𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 … Operator costs [€] 
 
• Social costs as difference between operator profit and generalized user costs 
𝑆𝐶 = Π𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 − 𝐺𝐶𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑟 
With: 𝑆𝐶 … Social costs (omitting external costs) [€] 
 𝐺𝐶𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑟 … generalized user costs [€] 
 
Operator profit and social costs 
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Area type classification 
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BIK BIK-category 




1 Rural < 2 k X 
2 Rural 2 - 5 k X 
3 Rural 5 - 20 k X 
4 Rural 20 - 50 k X 
5 Suburban 50 - 100 k X 
6 Urban 50 - 100 k √ 
7 Suburban 100 - 500 k X 
8 Urban 100 - 500 k √ 
9 Suburban >= 500 k X 
10 Urban >= 500 k √ 
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Estimated parameter values 
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trip purpose car availability mode intercept beta_gc 
1 0 walk 0 -0.670665 
1 0 cycle -1.0872081 -0.670665 
1 0 car -4.3769592 -0.670665 
1 0 pt 0.387225 -0.670665 
1 0 ACS 0.4047568 -0.670665 
1 1 walk 0 -0.5458953 
1 1 cycle -0.8393514 -0.5458953 
1 1 car -0.2790663 -0.5458953 
1 1 pt -0.3491937 -0.5458953 
1 1 ACS -0.31413 -0.5458953 
1 2 walk 0 -0.5458953 
1 2 cycle -0.8393514 -0.5458953 
1 2 car 1.0584506 -0.5458953 
1 2 pt -0.3491937 -0.5458953 
1 2 ACS -0.31413 -0.5458953 
2 0 walk 0 -0.2753231 
2 0 cycle -1.2532791 -0.2753231 
2 0 car -3.3000337 -0.2753231 
2 0 pt -1.3390296 -0.2753231 
2 0 ACS -0.8218296 -0.2753231 
2 1 walk 0 -0.3396498 
2 1 cycle -1.6771383 -0.3396498 
2 1 car -0.4223544 -0.3396498 
2 1 pt -2.4911545 -0.3396498 
2 1 ACS -1.4567544 -0.3396498 
2 2 walk 0 -0.3396498 
2 2 cycle -1.6771383 -0.3396498 
2 2 car 0.1148534 -0.3396498 
2 2 pt -2.4911545 -0.3396498 
2 2 ACS -1.4567544 -0.3396498 
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Backup results 
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Methodology: Assumptions on the setting of 
fleet-density/user-price-combinations 
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• Different fleet densities at a given user price for the assumptions of a zero-
profit-case, a max-profit-case and a social-optimum-case 
𝚷=0 
𝚷=max 
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Methodology: Assumptions on the setting of 
fleet-density/user-price-combinations 










• Oerator profit in the social-optimum-case is less or equal to that one in the 
max-profit-case for all user prices 
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Methodology: Assumptions on the setting of 
fleet-density/user-price-combinations 










• Social welfare in the social-optimum-case is greter than or equal to that one in 
the max-profit-case for all user prices 
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Methodology: Operator profit, generalized user costs 
and social welfare 
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